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ABSTRACT 
Studies on the productivity spillovers of FDI have concentrated on the 
national-sectoral level. As a result, little is known about the impact of FDI 
on absolute and relative regional economic performance. In this paper we 
examine this issue by relying on a unique dataset of over 20,000 Greek 
firms for the period 2002-2006 covering all sectors of economic activity. We 
examine the spatial distribution of foreign-owned firms in the country and 
analyse the effect that their presence –at the local, regional and national 
levels– has on the productivity of domestic firms. We find strong evidence 
suggesting that foreign-owned firms self-select into regions and sectors of 
high productivity. Net of this selection effect, the impact of foreign 
presence on domestic productivity is negative –although at the very local 
level some positive spillover effects are identifiable. The bulk of the effects 
concentrate in non-manufacturing activities, high-tech sectors, and 
medium-sized high-productivity firms. Importantly, this effect is not 
constant across space however. Productivity spillovers tend to be more 
negative in the regions hosting the main urban areas in the country while 
they are more positive in smaller and more peripheral regions. In this 
way, despite the tendency of FDI to concentrate in a few only areas within 
the country –those of the highest level of development– the externalities 
that FDI activity generates to the local economies appear to be of a rather 
equilibrating character. 
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Regional distribution and spatial impact of FDI in Greece: 




It is a widely held view that foreign direct investment (FDI) is a significant and 
positive contributor to economic growth. For this reason, national and, 
increasingly, regional governments exert particular efforts and commit a 
sizeable amount of resources (either through branding or in the form of 
subsidies and incentives) to attract foreign investments. Although the macro-
econometric evidence is largely consistent with this view, showing a positive 
causal relationship between FDI and growth (see, for example, Barrell and 
Pain, 1997; Borensztein et al, 1998; Mody and Murshid, 2002; Neuhaus, 2006), 
it has proved much more difficult to pinpoint exactly the processes under which 
this causal link takes effect. One plausible avenue through which the positive 
impacts of FDI can materialise is by productivity spillovers accruing to 
domestic firms due to the presence and operations of foreign-owned affiliates.1  
There are numerous processes that may account for such spillovers. These 
include pecuniary and technological spillovers, as well as competition effects 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Pecuniary 
                                                 
1
 Other possible channels include the direct gains from capital inflows (i.e., direct productivity gains 
and job creation from the incoming foreign affiliates) and taxation, gains through improved export 
performance, gains to monetary policy (through increasing foreign reserves and currency appreciation), 
and other macroeconomic gains through improvements in the balance of payments and, subsequently, 
expansion of domestic demand (see Caves, 2007; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; see also Thirlwall and 
Hussain, 1982).   
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spillovers accrue when FDI firms increase demand for intermediate inputs 
(through their supply linkages) and final products of domestic firms. 
Technological spillovers may arise either through ‘demonstration’ (e.g., when a 
foreign affiliate requires a minimum standard for intermediate products 
purchased locally and assists its suppliers in the acquisition of the necessary 
technology to achieve this) or ‘imitation’ (e.g., when domestic producers copy 
the technology of their new-found competitors). Finally, positive competition 
effects may arise in cases where market capturing by a foreign affiliate, due to 
their productivity advantages, squeezes out of the market the least productive 
domestic firms and pushes the surviving firms to technological upgrading and 
innovation activities in order to survive in the more competitive environment.2  
Although most of the relevant literature focuses on the national level, in the 
sense that it does not examine the regional differentiation or regional 
implications of such effects, it is important to note that FDI-induced 
productivity spillovers can take a particularly heterogeneous geographical 
manifestation (Mullen and Williams, 2007). This is for a number of reasons. 
First, foreign investors are looking for access not only to raw materials and 
cheap labour (resource-seeking FDI), but also to large markets that can offer 
supportive financial and business services, accessibility to international markets 
and, perhaps more importantly, access to domestic political and business elites. 
                                                 
2
 Of course, negative competition effects are also possible, in cases where market-capturing by the 
foreign affiliates creates a ‘demand-siphoning’ effect for the domestic firms which raises average 
production costs and lowers productivity (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). See Smeets (2008) for an 
excellent review of these theoretical channels and Moran et al (2005) for an extensive discussion of 
positive and negative productivity effects that arise from FDI. 
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This type of market- and efficiency-seeking FDI tends to locate in national 
capitals and a few other highly accessible and relatively developed regions 
within host economies and, in doing so, reinforces existing spatial asymmetries 
in production structures and capabilities (Guimaraes et al, 2000; Cantwell and 
Iammarino, 2001; Resmini, 2008 –see Pantelidis and Nikolopoulos, 2008 for 
the case of Greece). Second, as is by now established in the literature, the 
beneficial effects of FDI are largely subject to the so-called ‘absorptive 
capacity’ of domestic firms (see Kokko, 1994; Damijan et al, 2001; Girma, 
2005; Merlevede and Schoors, 2005; Jordaan, 2005, 2008, 2009; Crespo and 
Fontoura, 2007; Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011). It follows that foreign 
investments in less developed regions have a lower potential for positive 
spillovers, either because the technological distance between the foreign 
affiliates and the domestic firms does not allow for potential spillovers to be 
absorbed, or because more developed regions succeed in “creaming-off” the 
most productive foreign investors. In such a case, less developed regions are 
left with FDI firms of lower technological content, inherently limiting the 
scope of their positive spillovers. Indeed, Driffield and Munday (2001) provide 
evidence for the UK suggesting that spillovers are higher in industries that 
agglomerate spatially and concentrate in high-productivity regions.  
Nevertheless, foreign investments, even of limited quality and technology, may 
still generate above-average advantages in less developed regions. By relaxing 
existing capital accumulation constraints, they may resolve economic 
bottlenecks, such as depopulation and brain-drain or weak production links, 
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which are responsible for the economic backwardness of these regions in the 
first place. To the extent that they do, they ought to raise local (domestic) 
productivity even beyond the level that could be accounted for by their direct 
pecuniary and demonstration effects. Moreover, above-average advantages to 
less developed regions may also arise as the beneficial effects of FDI are 
generally smaller in environments where market competition (both in terms of 
openness to trade and market structure) is high –which is normally the case in 
more developed regions. This is because firms in developed regions are more 
exposed to competition and have thus already adjusted (positively or 
negatively) to the external stimuli of more competitive and more 
technologically advanced firms (Kinoshita, 2000; Merlevede and Schoors, 
2005; Gersl et al, 2007). Finally, less developed regions may benefit from a 
disproportional concentration of high-technology foreign firms, in cases where 
foreign investors locate in these regions as part of a strategy to protect their 
technological advantages from diffusing to their domestic competitors who are 
typically located in the more developed regions of the host country.  
By implication therefore, the overall impact of foreign investment on the host 
country’s regional economic structure and performance is rather ambiguous, as 
the theoretical effects can go either way. Interestingly, this issue has largely 
been ignored in empirical research on FDI spillovers, while it has also received 
only limited attention in regional studies of industrial performance (exceptions 
are the studies by Mullen and Williams, 2007, Haskel et al, 2007 and Jordaan, 
2008). In this paper we seek to partially fill this gap, by providing an analysis 
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of the location and productivity spillovers of FDI at the regional and sub-
regional (local) level. We perform our analysis on Greece, a country that is 
known to have a significantly skewed production structure, characterised by an 
over-concentration of economic activity in a few centres and an overall low 
degree of FDI attraction. Our data cover the period 2002-2006, a period of 
relative stability and fast growth, starting after the country’s successful 
adoption of the EURO and ending before the first signs of the global financial 
crisis. All data are derived from the Amadeus database produced by Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD), which contains firm-level information on turnover, fixed assets, 
employment, ownership and other variables of interest for the majority of 
European countries, covering all sectors of economic activity. For Greece, the 
Amadeus database contains some 27,000 firms per year, of which just over 
2,000 are foreign owned, representing an employment share of 7.78%.3 This 
dataset is unique in its detail and coverage and, to our knowledge, it has not 
been used before for the case of Greece.  
With the use of this unique information, we set out in this paper to explore two 
main questions. First, what has been the incidence and sectoral distribution of 
foreign activity across the regional economies of Greece. Second, what has 
been the effect of foreign activity on the productivity of domestic firms in the 
country and to what extent is this effect regionally differentiated. We examine 
                                                 
3
 As is standard in the literature, we define a firm as foreign owned if at least 10% of its value is owned 
by an ultimate owner who is resident or established outside the country. After excluding thus defined 
foreign affiliates as well as observations with missing, incomplete or erroneous information, our 
estimating sample reduces to just over 20,000 firms (98,408 firms-specific observations in the pooled 
sample) –bringing the average employment share of foreign-owned firms to just below 13%.   
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the first question in section 2. Section 3 presents our econometric analysis, 
which explores in detail the productivity spillovers of the presence of FDI. In 
section 4 we analyse the issue of spatial and functional differentiation of these 
spillovers. The paper concludes with a short discussion of the implications of 
our findings for the regional scholarship on the issue of FDI as well as for 
regional and national economic policy in Greece. 
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2. FDI in Greece and it’s regions 
Greece has not been historically an important recipient of FDI. The country 
embarked on a policy to encourage inward investments since the 1950s and 
while FDI flows recorded an almost continuous growth (in absolute terms) for 
decades (Louri et al, 2000), its total inward FDI stock was below 10% of GDP 
in the 1990s and 2000s with annual FDI flows representing less than 10% of 
total gross fixed capital formation in the country (UNCTAD, 2009). As a result, 
Greece ranks persistently at the bottom of the international rankings of FDI 
recipients and its FDI stock represents less than 1% of the total inward FDI 
stock of the EU27. Moreover, it appears that the technology content of the 
inward FDI in Greece is also particularly low: according to data by the Bank of 
Greece, in 2008 manufacturing accounted for some 33% of the total stock of 
inward FDI, almost two-thirds of which was in sectors producing consumer 
goods, with FDI in the manufacture of capital goods representing a mere 0.8% 
of the total FDI stock in the country.  
This is consistent with findings of previous research, which has shown that FDI 
is below the country’s potential (Papazoglou, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004; 
Kokkinou and Psycharis, 2004), predominantly of a market-seeking type 
(Georganta et al, 1986; Georgopoulos and Preusse, 2006), and concentrating in 
traditional sectors that are characterised by low technology and labour-
intensive production (Barrios et al, 2004). The low degree and quality of FDI in 
the country has often been attributed to factors such as the extent of red-tape 
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and bureaucracy, high tax rates, poor infrastructure and an overall weak 
business and macroeconomic environment (Apergis and Katrakylidis, 1998; 
Barbosa and Louri, 2002; Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004; Pantelidis and 
Nikolopoulos, 2008).  
Previous research has also shown that FDI in Greece is highly concentrated, 
along both sectoral and spatial lines (Dimelis et al, 2004; Bitzenis et al, 2007). 
Indeed, together with manufacturing, three other sectors account jointly for 
over 90% of the FDI stock in the country (financial services 30%, transport and 
communications 15%, wholesale/retail trade 13%).4 Interestingly, the Hotel and 
Restaurants sector, which includes the tourism industry, one of the country’s 
main comparative advantages, only accounts for 2% of total FDI stock. FDI 
appears also particularly concentrated across space. Bank of Greece data show 
that in the period 2000-2008 only 25 out of the 51 NUTS3 regions of the 
country received any form of FDI, with 87% of FDI inflows going to the 
prefecture of Attiki, where the national capital is situated, and the fifth highest 
FDI recipient accounting for a mere 0.5% of total FDI inflows into the country 
(€100m compared to a national figure of €18.8bn). 
                                                 
4
 Data refer to the on the book value of investments derived from the Bank of Greece. In our data we 
get a similar picture of concentration in these main sectors, although given that we use employment 
than investment shares the ranking of the sectors is different, reflecting sectoral differences in capital-
labour ratios. The four main sectors account in our data for 85% of total employment in foreign-owned 
firms (wholesale and retail trade: 37%;  manufacturing: 26%; transport and telecommunications: 14%; 
financial and business services: 8%).  
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Figure 1. FDI by region (period average, 2002-2006) 
 
 
      Total            Manufacturing              Non-manufacturing 
Notes: Regions have been classified into five groups using either a ‘natural break’ criterion (top panel; 
implemented in ArcView) or the quintiles of the distribution of FDI employment shares (bottom panel). 
Darker shades show higher values.  
 
Thus, both along sectoral and geographical lines, the distribution of foreign-
owned activity in Greece is particularly skewed, with FDI being of an 
important relative size in only a few sectors and regions. This is also revealed 
in the data derived from the Amadeus database. Using this data, Figure 1 
presents the geography of FDI concentrations (employment in foreign-owned 
firms as a share of total employment) averaged over the 2002-2006 period and 
split by sector (manufacturing – non-manufacturing) and NUTS3 region. As 
can be seen, high-concentrations of foreign-owned activity are mainly in the 
regions of Attiki and Thessaloniki, which host the two main urban centres in 
the country, and secondarily in the island regions of Lesvos (for 
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of FDI in the country is better illustrated with the use of Figure 2, which 
depicts a picture of “FDI islands”, showing that in only two regions in the 
country does employment in foreign-owned firms represent more than 6% of 
total regional employment –while in only another 10 regions does it represent a 
share above 2%. 
Figure 2. The Greek “FDI islands” (FDI by region, period average, 2002-2006) 
 
Notes: Pale shadow: <2% of total employment; Grey: 2-6% of regional employment; Black: 6-20% of 
regional employment. 
 
A quick inspection of these two Figures may seem to suggest a rather high 
degree of concentration of FDI. Specifically, one can identify two clusters, 
around the main cities of Athens (Attiki, Voiotia, Evoia) and Thessaloniki 
(Thessaloniki, Kilkis, Pieria), but also some ‘hotspots’ of FDI activity in the 
periphery. To see to what extent there is spatial concentration across or within 
regions, we performed an exploratory spatial data analysis (see Anselin, 1995) 
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the results of which are reported in Figure 3. The maps depict the membership 
of regions into different types of spatial association. Dark red depicts regions 
that have high values of FDI employment and are also surrounded by regions of 
high values. Inversely, light red depicts high-FDI regions which are surrounded 
by regions with low FDI shares. Similarly, dark (light) blue depicts regions that 
have low values of FDI employment and are surrounded by regions of low 
(high) values. Regions for which no statistical association exists between local 
and neighbouring values are coloured white. 
Figure 3. Local clusters of FDI (LISA maps, 4-nearest neighbours criterion) 
 
FDI:  Total       Manufacturing  Non-manufacturing 
Moran’s I: 0.0016      0.0283     -0.0200 
Note: LISA maps present membership to different clusters (high-high; high-low; low-high; low-low) 
for cases where local spatial association is statistically significant. The global Moran’s I reported below 
each map measures the extent of spatial association across regions nationally. 
 
As can be seen, there is very little evidence of clustering across space. The 
Moran’s I, which measures the extent to which local outcomes correlate with 
outcomes in neighbouring regions, is effectively zero; while although a few 
‘hotspots’ can be identified, these are not necessarily in the places one would 
expect them to appear. Specifically, for total FDI there are two main hotspots, 
both located in the west (Ioannina and Etoloakarnania). These two regions are 
  12 
effectively ‘spatial outliers’, having relatively high shares of FDI but being 
surrounded by regions with low FDI shares. Three other regions constitute 
negative outliers, in the sense that they are neighbouring regions with high 
values but they themselves have low shares of employment in foreign-owned 
firms. Finally, two main clusters are also observable: Kozani in the north is the 
centre of a low-low cluster, while Evoia in Central Greece signifies the high-
high cluster which extends southwards to Attiki and northwards to Magnisia 
(see also Figure 2). Interestingly, this picture is not replicated in either of the 
maps that depict the geography of spatial association of FDI employment in the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The Etoloakarnania outlier 
survives in the case of manufacturing and some new outliers emerge in the case 
of non-manufacturing, but overall there is very little consistency between the 
different maps, suggesting that even in cases where local spatial association is 
statistically significant, the extent of clustering across regions is rather weak.  
The high degree of concentration of FDI in a few regions in Greece and its low 
technological content makes it plausible that, despite being a relatively small 
proportion of the domestic economy, it can generate significant spillovers. This 
is because spillovers often occur inside agglomerations and in a rather localised 
manner (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2009)5 and because the low 
technological content means that problems of absorptive capacity for the 
domestic firms are less likely to arise. Indeed, this is not refuted in the scant 
literature that exists on the topic in Greece. The study by Dimelis and Louri 
                                                 
5
 See however Haskel et al (2007) for evidence against this.  
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(2002) for a sample of manufacturing firms found some evidence of positive 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms – but only from firms with a minority 
foreign ownership. A similar effect was found by Barrios et al (2004), although 
in that study the effect vanished when controls were introduced for sectoral 
heterogeneity. Finally, Fotopoulos and Louri (2004) also provide indirect 
evidence of positive spillovers in their analysis of foreign presence and 
domestic firm growth, finding that foreign participation accelerates firm growth 
especially for medium-sized firms. To our knowledge, no other study has 
examined the extent and nature of FDI spillovers in Greece and no study has 
done so with any attention to the geography of these spillovers. Our analysis in 
the remainder of this paper seeks to fill this gap by providing unique evidence 
on the direction and intensity of FDI spillovers across the Greek regions. 
 
 
3. FDI spillovers across the Greek regions 
As mentioned earlier, our dataset consists of firm-level data on turnover, fixed 
assets and employment, organised across sectors (NACE2 and NACE4), 
regions (NUTS2 and NUTS3) and years (2002-2006). Additionally, we have 
aggregated the foreign ownership information at the sectoral (NACE2) and 
regional (NUTS3) level to construct a variable measuring the intra-sector share 
of foreign ownership in each of the 51 prefectures of Greece. As is standard in 
the literature, we follow a production-function approach, where firm-level 
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output is made a function of each firm’s value of fixed assets and level of 
employment, adding the FDI variable as an additional regressor. Our approach 
implies that investment and manning decisions are not influenced by a firms’ 
own productivity and that FDI affects a firm’s total factor productivity but not 
its level of investment or employment. Although the literature has occasionally 
questioned the full validity of such assumptions (see Olley and Pakes, 1996; 
Javorcik, 2004), others have shown that the bias introduced by these 
assumptions is minimal, especially in empirical studies with limited time-
horizons (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011). 
Empirically, our estimating model takes the following form: 
yirst = a + b1kirst + b2lirst + eirst      (1) 
which we later amend with the inclusion of the FDI variable and occasionally 
by adding various fixed effects. Thus, our full estimating model is 
yirst = a + b1kirst + b2lirst + cHrst + Rrd1 + Ssd2 + Ttd3 + Fid4 + eirst  (2) 
where small letters stand for logarithms, y is turnover; k is capital (measured by 
fixed assets); l is employment; H is the employment share of foreign-owned 
firms; R, S, T, and F are vectors containing binary dummies for regions, 
sectors, time and firms, respectively; a, b1, b2, c, d1, d2, d3and d4 are coefficients 
to be estimated; i, r, s, and t index firms, regions, sectors and time, 
respectively; and e is an error term. We do not restrict the coefficients b1 and b2 
to add up to one, thus allowing for increasing or decreasing returns to scale. We 
experiment with different definitions of the H variable (at the NUTS2 level, the 
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NUTS3 level, or both) and we introduce the various sets of dummy variables 
selectively in alternative specifications.  
Given the fact that our sample contains many dimensions (sectors, regions, 
years), we start our analysis by examining the performance of our production-
function model across alternative fixed-effects specifications, introducing 
gradually additional regressors to control for these dimensions. Table 1 
presents the results from this analysis. As can be seen, our base model performs 
very well and the obtained factor elasticities are very robust to the inclusion of 
controls for the different dimensions of our dataset. The coefficient on capital is 
rather low, but within acceptable limits, and it increases somewhat when we 
add sectoral controls, which appear to control partly for differences in capacity 
utilisation. The coefficient on labour is much more stable suggesting little 
variation across sectors or regions in the extent of labour hoarding. Together, 
the two coefficients are consistently below 1, suggesting the presence of 
decreasing returns to scale in the Greek economy – a finding which is 
consistent with the widely acknowledged inefficiency of its production system 
(Bryant et al, 2001; Pagoulatos, 2003). It should be noted that adding temporal 
fixed effects does not affect the regression estimates, which is consistent with 
the observation that the 2002-2006 period was a period of relative stability for 
Greece. As mentioned above, adding sectoral controls raises the estimated 
productivity of capital – and this result changes little if we include controls at 
the 2- or 4-digit of the NACE classification (compare columns 3 and 4). The 
influence of the regional fixed effects (columns 5 and 6) is smaller and is again 
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very similar for fixed effects of different spatial scales (NUTS2 or NUTS3), 
suggesting that regional differences in production technologies are minimal and 
smaller than differences across sectors. In the last column of Table 1 we 
introduce firm-specific fixed effects which subsume the regional and sectoral 
controls. The decline in the estimated coefficients observed there is rather 
natural, as the fixed effects capture unobserved firm-specific characteristics 
which contribute to firm output, such as managerial capacities, 
distribution/client networks, and the like. 
Table 1. Production function analysis 
Model: 
ln(output) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.133*** 0.131*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.158*** 0.160*** 0.206*** 0.112*** Ln 
(capital) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0026) 
0.606*** 0.608*** 0.638*** 0.628*** 0.574*** 0.573*** 0.612*** 0.397*** Ln 
(employ-
ment) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.016) 
Constant 5.002*** 4.901*** 4.525*** 4.440*** 4.686*** 4.715*** 4.129*** 5.564*** 
 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.038) (0.099) (0.025) (0.044) (0.10) (0.041) 
Fixed 
effects No Time Nace2 Nace4 NUTS2 NUTS3 All 
Firms 
& Time 
Obs 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 
R-sq 0.35 0.35 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.54 0.05 
Notes: Model (8) is estimated using the Fixed Effects Within estimator. All other regressions are 
estimated with OLS. NACE2 (NACE4) contains 54 (429) sectoral dummies while NUTS2 (NUTS3) 
contains 13 (51) regional dummies. The model of column 7 includes dummies for NACE4, NUTS3 and 
time.  
To this basic but well performing specification we add next our FDI variable. 
We experiment with different specifications of this variable for reasons that 
will become clear in the discussion that follows. Table 2 presents a set of key 
findings. We start by introducing a sector-specific FDI measure calculated at 
the NUTS2 level (columns 1-5). 
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Table 2. The impact of FDI on domestic productivity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Capital  0.156*** 0.112*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.199*** 0.157*** 0.112*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.200*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.200***
  
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Employment 0.589*** 0.396*** 0.636*** 0.636*** 0.624*** 0.588*** 0.396*** 0.635*** 0.635*** 0.624*** 0.615*** 0.606*** 0.635*** 0.624***
  
(0.0038) (0.016) (0.0036) (0.032) (0.028) (0.0038) (0.016) (0.0036) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) 
FDI (nuts2) 1.701*** 0.148*** 0.237*** 0.237 -0.549***            -0.407 -0.827** 
  
(0.028) (0.041) (0.03) (0.15) (0.19)            (0.32) (0.33) 
FDI (nuts3)          1.730*** 0.138*** 0.284*** 0.284* -0.428**     0.667** 0.310 
  
         (0.027) (0.04) (0.029) (0.17) (0.19)     (0.33) (0.28) 
FDI(t-1) nuts3                -0.455**       
  
               (0.19)       
FDI(t-2) nuts3                  -0.500**     
 
           (0.21)   

















































Constant 4.703*** 5.546*** 4.430*** 4.430*** 4.240*** 4.702*** 5.548*** 4.428*** 4.428*** 4.245*** 4.306*** 4.444*** 4.430*** 4.239*** 
  
-0.012 -0.042 -0.039 -0.075 -0.12 -0.012 -0.042 -0.039 -0.074 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.075 -0.12 
Observations 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407 79801 60045 98407 98407 
R-squared 0.37 0.05 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.37 0.05 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parentheses. ***. ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Estimations where standard errors are clustered within 
NACE2 sectors are indicated with ‘cl(nace2)’; ‘Within’ is the fixed effects panel data estimator. 
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When not controlling for fixed effects, of any type, the impact of foreign firms 
on domestic productivity appears positive and very significant. An increase in 
the employment share of foreign-owned firms by one percentage point (e.g., 
from the sample average of 13% to 14%) raises domestic productivity by 1.7%, 
with the effect being significant well beyond the 1% level. Controlling for firm 
heterogeneity (column 2) maintains this significance but reduces the magnitude 
of the estimated spillover by more than 10 times. This clearly suggests that 
foreign investments concentrate in regions and sectors with high concentrations 
of firms that possess productivity-enhancing unobservable characteristics, such 
as good managerial practices and inter-firm networks. This is consistent with 
findings elsewhere in the literature (Head et al, 1995; Hilber and Voicu, 2010). 
The observed productivity spillovers increase somewhat when we replace the 
firm-specific fixed effects with sector-specific ones (column 3), but remain 
many times lower than that obtained through a simple OLS estimation (column 
1). Moreover, when we additionally cluster the standard errors within sectors 
(column 4) the estimated spillover effect becomes statistically not different 
from zero.6,7 This suggests that a large part of the self-selection of foreign 
investments takes place across sectoral lines: high productivity sectors typically 
attract above-average amounts of FDI.  
                                                 
6
 This is necessary to account for the fact that our FDI variable is measured at the sectoral level. 
Clustered standard errors relax the assumption that the observations in the dataset are independent. By 
clustering within sectors we effectively allow for the possibility that firm-specific productivities within 
sectors may be correlated and thus, additionally, that disturbances across sectors may be 
heteroskedastic. 
7
 The same result is obtained when we cluster the standard errors within regions, as well as when we 
cluster within region-sector clusters (results available upon request).  
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The influence of self-selection, however, appears even stronger in its spatial 
dimension. In column 5, where we add the NUTS3 fixed effects, the estimated 
spillover effect becomes significantly negative and rather large (a rise in 
foreign presence by 1 percentage point reduces domestic productivity by 
0.55%). In other words, when we control for geographical differences in 
productivity, the effect of FDI turns out negative. This result, which is very 
consistent across different specifications as we shall see later, has a very 
important implication for the study of the spatial effects of FDI: productivity 
spillovers appear misleadingly positive, largely due to the fact that foreign 
investments concentrate –in the case of Greece very heavily– in regions of 
above-average productivity. Net of this self-selection effect, the impact of FDI 
is to reduce domestic productivity, reflecting a negative competition effect, 
which presumably operates via one of the following channels: by lowering pre-
existing monopolistic rents, by creaming off skilled labour in the sector/region, 
or by lowering the market share of domestic firms. All these channels are 
consistent with features that are known to characterise the Greek economy, 
such as low labour mobility, low effective competition within sectors and 
attraction of foreign investments which are predominantly of a market-seeking 
type.   
These results are fully replicated when using an FDI measure defined at a much 
narrower geographical scale, namely the NUTS3 level, as depicted in columns 
6-10 of Table 2. The results there are qualitatively identical to those obtained 
from the NUTS2-level analysis, although in general the estimated elasticities 
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are somewhat higher, implying that the positive impact of foreign presence on 
domestic productivity is stronger at a more localised level.  
The negative spillover effect that we identify when controlling for regional 
fixed effects –and thus for self-selection of foreign affiliates into high-
productivity regions– casts doubt on the conventional wisdom about the 
beneficial effects of FDI but is not at odds with empirical estimates in the 
international literature (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 
1999; Blomström and Sjoholm, 1999; Damijan et al, 2001; Kugler, 2006; 
Gorodnichenko et al, 2007 - see also footnote 2). A possible factor that could 
account for this negative effect, if one maintains that the overall impact of FDI 
should be positive, is the possibility that the beneficial effects of FDI take time 
to materialise, i.e. occur with some hysterisis (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011). 
If this hypothesis is valid, then we should observe a contemporaneous negative 
association between foreign presence and domestic productivity but a more 
positive relation between current domestic productivity and past values of FDI. 
Although year-to-year variation in the share of foreign presence in the Greek 
economy is limited, which somewhat problematises the identification of this 
mechanism in our data, our estimations that test the hysterisis hypothesis 
(columns 11 and 12) do not seem to support this assumption: the estimated 
spillovers remain negative when we replace the contemporaneous FDI variable 
with its one- and two-year lags. In fact, the magnitude of the negative FDI 
effect is actually increasing, suggesting if anything a deterioration of domestic 
productivity as a response to foreign presence over time. It thus appears that 
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domestic firms do not adapt (at least not in a two-year horizon) to the negative 
shock of foreign presence and continue to suffer from the increased 
competition generated by the foreign affiliates. Again, this is consistent with 
the view of Greece as an economy that lacks dynamism and where competition 
is largely a zero-sum game which does not lead to market expansion. 
Returning to the point that we raised earlier about the geographical scale at 
which the positive and negative spillovers of FDI occur, in the last two 
columns of Table 2 we include simultaneously two FDI variables, measured at 
two different geographical scales (NUTS2 and NUTS3), alternatively 
excluding and then including our controls for regional fixed effects. In both 
cases, an interesting pattern emerges: FDI spillovers appear negative at the 
wider geographical scale but are consistently positive at the more localised 
level.8 This suggests that locally concentrated FDI helps the performance of 
domestic firms, especially in comparison to the performance of similar firms in 
other NUTS3 regions (since the estimated NUTS3 spillover is stronger and 
larger when not including regional fixed effects). At the same time, 
concentration of FDI in neighbouring areas, within a local economy’s 
administrative region, has an absolute negative effect on the performance of 
domestic firms. This offers an important insight into the workings of FDI 
spillovers in Greece. Positive FDI spillovers, presumably due to both pecuniary 
(demand) and technology effects (demonstration, imitation), do exist; but they 
                                                 
8
 The NUTS2 and NUTS3 spillover coefficients reported in columns 13 and 14 are not simultaneously 
significant statistically. They are however jointly significant in each of the regressions and also 
significantly different from each other. When replicating these regressions without clustering the 
standard errors all coefficients are highly significant even at the 0.1% level.   
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are very localised. Indeed, these benefits do not diffuse to wider geographical 
scales and thus at the regional (and national) level the competition and market 
capture effect of FDI dominates. Therefore, despite the localised benefits of 
FDI, the overall effect of FDI on domestic productivity, when taking into 
account the tendency of foreign investments to self-select into high-
productivity regions and sectors, is negative.  
These findings have important policy implications, which we address in the last 
section of the paper. Before we do so, there is one additional important angle of 
the FDI spillovers that we wish to explore, concerning the question of how 
these spillovers differentiate across different types of firms and across space. 
We examine this in the next section. 
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4. Spatial and functional heterogeneity of FDI spillovers 
The literature on FDI productivity spillovers has often found that spillovers do 
not accrue homogeneously across different types of firms and sectors but are 
rather dependent on specific firm characteristics such as size, technology 
content and sector of economic activity. A similar argument can be made about 
the heterogeneity of FDI effects across space, especially under the light of our 
preceding discussion and findings. In this section we explore these two issues, 
starting with the functional dimension. Table 3 reports the results from a set of 
regressions where we split the sample across sectoral characteristics 
(manufacturing versus non-manufacturing, high-tech sectors versus low-tech 
sectors), firm sizes (large, medium, small), and firm-specific technological 
content (high/low technology gap9). We perform this analysis for two 
alternative specifications of our model, first excluding (top panel) and then 
including regional fixed effects (bottom panel). All regressions include 
temporal and sectoral fixed effects and standard errors are clustered within 
sectors.  
The results are particularly revealing. Although in virtually all cases the pattern 
of positive localised spillovers and negative overall spillovers is maintained 
(with the exception of the results obtained for large firms, as discussed below), 
there are important variations in the effects observed for different firm types. 
The impact of FDI is much more heightened outside the manufacturing sector: 
                                                 
9
 The technology gap variable is measured as the distance of each domestic firm from the productivity 
frontier of its sector, which is proxied by the level of productivity achieved by the most productive 
foreign-owned firm in the sector nationally.  
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the localised (NUTS3) effect is more positive and stronger, while the diffused 
(NUTS2) effect is also stronger but more negative. In contrast, the impact of 
FDI in the manufacturing sector is statistically weak (although when 
introducing only one FDI variable at a time the obtained results are consistent 
with our earlier analysis). This is true both for including or excluding regional 
fixed effects. In the latter case, the negative diffused effect becomes larger, 
while the positive localised effect is smaller. This suggests that in non-
manufacturing sectors foreign firms self-select into high-productivity localities 
but, interestingly, away from localities that are neighbouring to high 




                                                 
10
 For the manufacturing sector the opposite pattern is observed, with foreign firms self-selecting into 
broader regions of high productivity but not necessarily into the localities with the highest productivity 
within these broad regions. The results here, however, lack statistical significance and thus this 
interpretation is tentative.  
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 WITHOUT REGIONAL DUMMIES 
Capital  0.224*** 0.186*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.252*** 0.175*** 0.186*** 0.148*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 
  (0.021) (0.019) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) 
Employment 0.633*** 0.632*** 0.644*** 0.633*** 0.690*** 0.532*** 0.729*** 0.307*** 0.716*** 0.792*** 
  (0.027) (0.040) (0.052) (0.038) (0.038) (0.028) (0.042) (0.026) (0.029) (0.041) 
FDI (nuts2) -0.0323 -0.915* -0.514 -0.350 0.562*** -0.705** -0.618* -0.813* 0.0527 -0.505 
  (0.27) (0.46) (0.60) (0.37) (0.18) (0.32) (0.33) (0.43) (0.16) (0.36) 
FDI (nuts3) 0.398 1.13** 1.35** 0.491 -0.111 0.853** 0.810** 0.810* 0.549*** 0.507 
  (0.28) (0.50) (0.58) (0.38) (0.15) (0.34) (0.33) (0.47) (0.16) (0.35) 
Constant 5.106*** 4.487*** 3.075*** 4.452*** 3.934*** 4.643*** 4.028*** 5.084*** 4.797*** 1.696*** 
 
(0.049) (0.088) (0.19) (0.082) (0.14) (0.070) (0.11) (0.073) (0.080) (0.061) 
Observations 26224 72183 18563 79844 20520 77887 53742 24145 48366 50041 
R-squared 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.73 0.58 
 INCLUDING REGIONAL DUMMIES 
Capital  0.236*** 0.191*** 0.195*** 0.199*** 0.260*** 0.181*** 0.195*** 0.151*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 
  (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Employment 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.634*** 0.621*** 0.676*** 0.523*** 0.712*** 0.307*** 0.701*** 0.793*** 
  (0.025) (0.035) (0.048) (0.034) (0.035) (0.025) (0.041) (0.027) (0.026) (0.040) 
FDI (nuts2) -0.191 -1.52*** -0.819*** -0.765* 0.295 -1.16*** -1.16*** -1.04*** -0.207 -0.642* 
  (0.27) (0.33) (0.25) (0.39) (0.21) (0.31) (0.33) (0.38) (0.16) (0.38) 
FDI (nuts3) 0.0598 0.661** 0.536** 0.254 -0.480** 0.499* 0.506* 0.446 0.275* 0.598* 
  (0.29) (0.30) (0.23) (0.33) (0.19) (0.26) (0.29) (0.36) (0.15) (0.34) 
Constant 4.589*** 4.461*** 2.366*** 4.265*** 4.052*** 4.419*** 3.673*** 5.064*** 4.671*** 1.566*** 
 
(0.093) (0.12) (0.34) (0.13) (0.18) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.10) (0.12) 
Observations 26224 72183 18563 79844 20520 77887 53742 24145 48366 50041 
R-squared 0.56 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.73 0.58 
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parentheses. ***. ** and * indicate significance levels at the 1, 5 and 10%. All regressions include time and sector dummies and 
standard errors clustered at the NACE2 level.  
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In a somewhat similar fashion, localised FDI spillovers appear stronger (more 
positive) in high-tech sectors, especially when we do not control for self-
selection, and the diffused spillover effect appears more negative, especially 
when we do control for self-selection. Although the results for the low-tech 
sectors are of a similar nature, they are more modest and at the margin of 
statistical significance. Our findings, however, differ markedly when we split 
our sample by firm size. For large firms, the presence of foreign-owned 
affiliates within the same locality appears to produce negative, not positive, 
productivity effects, especially when we control for self-selection. In contrast, 
it is the diffused spillovers that turn out positive. This suggests an interesting 
property for large firms in Greece: co-location with foreign affiliates seems to 
hamper their performance, presumably as large firms have less to gain from 
demonstration effects and pecuniary spillovers accruing from their foreign-
owned competitors; but the agglomeration of foreign firms in the wider region, 
outside the domestic large firms’ own locality, has a positive effect on their 
performance. The absence of localised benefits in the presence of wider-scale 
ones, seems to suggest that foreign-firm concentration tends to generate a 
market-creation effect for large firms, which is not operational in the case of 
medium and small firms within the same sector. For the latter, and especially 
for medium-sized firms, the main (and only) benefit is from the presence of 
foreign affiliates within the local economy, while the wider-scale effect is 
consistently and very strongly negative. An obvious interpretation of this 
finding is that smaller firms do not have the reach to capture the benefits from 
  27 
the market-creation effect at wider geographical scales. Medium-sized firms 
appear able to internalise successfully some of the positive spillovers of foreign 
participation in the local economy, while very small firms lack the absorptive 
capacity to do so, which would explain why the estimated localised spillover 
effect fails to reach significance for these firms.  
The level of productivity, or technology capacity, of domestic firms does not 
seem to be a crucial factor for the internalisation and realisation of FDI 
spillovers. Firms with a lower technological gap appear to benefit more from 
the presence of foreign firms in the local economy and to suffer less from the 
agglomeration of foreign affiliates at the wider geographical scale outside the 
local economy, but this effect is subject more to self-selection (foreign firms 
locating in localities with higher concentrations of high technology firms 
within any given sector) than in the case of firms with a lower technology 
content (higher technology gap). Consistent with the ‘absorptive capacity’ and 
‘market capture’ interpretations that we have advanced in our analysis so far, 
the latter appear best placed to reap the benefits of co-location (technology 
transfers and pecuniary effects) but also more susceptible to suffering from 
competition with foreign-owned firms at a wider geographical scale.  
What do these patterns imply for the geography of productivity spillovers 
accruing from the concentration of foreign-owned firms across the Greek 
economy? We examine this by replicating the regressions presented in columns 
5 and 10 of Table 2, this time interacting the FDI variable with a set of regional 
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(alternatively, NUTS2 and NUTS3) dummies.11 This provides us with a full set 
of region-specific estimates for the productivity effects of FDI on domestic 
firms. It is of course difficult to report the full set of obtained coefficients in 
tabular form (in the NUTS3 analysis, this set contains 51 region-specific 
spillover coefficients). Instead, in Figure 4 we offer a visualisation of the 
magnitude and geography of these effects. The top panel depicts the results 
obtained from the NUTS3-level analysis (corresponding to the regression of 
column 10 in Table 2), while the bottom panel presents the results of the 
NUTS2-level analysis. The right-hand side maps correspond to regressions that 
include locational fixed effects (regional or local), which take into account the 
self-selection of foreign firms into high-productivity regions.  
As can be seen, there is significant variation both in the size and, more 
importantly, in the direction of the estimated effects. At the NUTS2 level, when 
not controlling for self-selection (bottom-left map), this variation is less 
heightened and the overall picture appears to be one of a core-periphery 
pattern. Peripheral regions in the north-east, west and south appear unable to 
internalise positive productivity spillovers, thus ending up with a net loss in 
their performance. In contrast, more central regions, especially in central and 
western mainland Greece, experience net gains from the presence of foreign-
owned firms. Controlling for self-selection, however, completely overturns this 
picture: in this case, the direct productivity effect of FDI is negative in all 
                                                 
11
 We can not replicate this analysis for the models presented in columns 13 and 14 of Table 2, as the 
NUTS2-level effects are absorbed completely by the NUTS3-level effects when both are included in 
the same model.   
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regions (consistent with the findings reported in column 5 of Table 2), but with 
one important exception. The region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace appears 
now to benefit from positive spillovers, suggesting that self-selection in this 
region operates in the opposite direction. The structure of incentives operating 
in this region through the country’s Incentives Laws (Filippaios and Kottaridi, 
2004) may have a big role to play here, as foreign firms may locate there not 
because the region offers a high concentration of more productive firms but 
rather because the structure of incentives provided by the government attracts 
high-productivity foreign affiliates to this low-productivity region. In any case, 
the issue of regional incentives aside, our results suggest that had the average 
productivity of this region been the same as the average productivity nationally, 
the effect of foreign presence in the region would have been to raise the overall 
productivity of the domestic firms located there. 
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Figure 4. Region-specific estimates of local FDI spillovers 
 
  
Without local/regional fixed-effects |   Including local/regional fixed effects 
Notes: Red: significantly negative spillovers; White: spillovers close to or not different from zero; 
Green: significantly positive spillovers in three groups (shades of green): 0.5%-2%, 2%-10% and >10%. 
 
The NUTS3-level analysis (top panel) suggests that this is essentially due to 
two more localised effects: a negative effect in Xanthi, which after controlling 
for selection turns mildly positive, and a mildly positive effect in Evros, which 
after controlling for selection becomes even stronger. Besides this, self-
selection seems to operate more strongly (and to result to a negative overall 
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regions hosting three of the five largest cities in Greece– and less strongly in 
the cases of Kilkis and Trikala. FDI spillovers are invariably negative 
(irrespective of controls for region-specific fixed effects) in Pella, Kerkyra, 
Chania and Irakleio; while inverse self-selection (into low productivity regions) 
appears, besides Xanthi and Evros, in the cases of Magnisia, Korinthos, 
Argolida, Lasithi, and the Dodecanese. Interestingly, the estimated spillovers of 
FDI are persistently negligible in the prefectures of Ioannina, Lesvos, 
Rethymno, Voiotia and Achaia (despite the fact that the latter two are rather 
highly industrialised), while the most positive FDI effect at the NUTS3 level, 
which appears also independent of self-selection, is observed in the case of 
Preveza –whose predominantly agricultural economy (representing some 30% 
of total employment) has attracted in the past some modest, but highly 
concentrated, foreign investment in the manufacture of wood and wood 
products. 
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5. Discussion 
Foreign direct investment can be an important source of economic development 
for recipient economies. FDI inflows constitute a positive demand shock that 
strengthens capital accumulation and job creation domestically. Moreover, they 
improve the fiscal and external position of the recipient countries, by 
generating additional tax revenues, strengthening export performance and 
improving their balance of payments –thus helping finance government 
expenditures that can further stimulate economic development. Besides these 
macroeconomic effects, foreign investments may have more direct effects on 
industrial activity and performance, through the impact that they have on the 
technology and productivity of domestic firms. As foreign investments have 
technological and other productivity advantages over domestic firms, their 
presence can generate significant externalities for the domestic economy. These 
can operate mainly through three channels: pecuniary/demand spillovers, 
technological/learning spillovers, and competition effects.  
There is now a large literature examining the magnitude and direction of these 
effects. Reflecting its industrial and business economics origins, the literature 
has typically focused at the national-sectoral level, as these spillovers are 
assumed to operate along sectoral lines. Nevertheless, scholarship in the urban 
and regional economics literature and in economic geography has long 
identified co-location, agglomeration and proximity as essential factors for the 
generation and diffusion of productivity spillovers. The limited attention that 
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the FDI literature has placed on such factors constitutes an important omission 
and a constraint to the deeper understanding of the conditions under which 
spillovers from FDI operate and materialise. The spatial dimension of these 
issues becomes even more important when considering the fact that FDI tends 
to be particularly concentrated, especially in locations of high productivity, 
accessibility and industrial agglomeration.  
Our analysis in this paper, for the case of Greece, has sought to contribute to 
filling this gap by examining the spatial distribution of foreign presence and the 
spatial heterogeneity of its effects. Our results confirm that FDI tends to 
concentrate in only a few locations and to self-select into regions and sectors of 
high productivity. It thus acts to heighten existing spatial imbalances, as the 
productive capacity of the most developed regions is strengthened and the 
relative performance of regions located in the economic periphery deteriorates. 
Nevertheless, although this effect on the spatial structure is important, our 
analysis has found that FDI does not raise the productivity of domestic firms, 
neither contemporaneously nor in a longer time-horizon. In this sense, the 
concentration of FDI in the most developed regions in the country is not a 
hindrance to regional growth and convergence for the less well-off regions. 
This is consistent with the scant evidence in the literature about the localised 
effects of FDI (Mullen and Wiliams, 2007; Haskel et al, 2007).  
Besides this, our analysis has shown further that the productivity spillovers of 
FDI exhibit substantial heterogeneity across space, even after controlling for 
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regional differences in the volume and sectoral composition of FDI. To our 
knowledge, this is a unique finding in the literature. Moreover, it has very 
important policy implications, pointing to a strong need for FDI-attracting 
policies to incorporate a clear regional dimension. This is because if, as it 
seems, FDI is not equally beneficial (or harmful) across the national economic 
space, maximising the benefits of FDI at the aggregate/national level 
necessitates paying specific attention to the set of endogenous (e.g., average 
firm sizes) and exogenous (e.g., proximity to main agglomerations) locational 
characteristics that influence local abilities to benefit from FDI spillovers. In 
other words, it requires policies that are spatially targeted and selective.   
Our analysis has identified a number of factors that condition the externalities 
that are generated by the presence of foreign-owned activity. Some of these, 
concerning firm- and sector-specific characteristics, such as size, sector of 
activity and technology content, have already been identified in the literature 
and the evidence presented here has simply lent further support to them.12 
Some other factors, however, namely the extent of agglomeration and the 
geographical proximity to foreign presence, are much more novel and perhaps 
more important for understanding the spatial processes that underlie FDI 
spillovers. Specifically, our results indicate that FDI spillovers are invariably 
negative in regions hosting the main urban areas in the country (Athens, 
                                                 
12
 Specifically, we find that FDI spillovers are stronger in non-manufacturing and high-tech sectors and 
for medium-sized and high-productivity firms. Other factors identified in the literature include the size 
of the foreign presence (non-linear effects), the capital intensity of the industrial sector concerned, the 
extent of ownership (minority, majority, full ownership) and the nature (greenfield, brownfield) of the 
foreign investment (see Moran et al, 2005, and Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2010, for a discussion). 
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Thessaloniki, Irakleio, Larissa), while they are positive, even after controlling 
for selection, in smaller and more peripheral regions. Whether this signifies an 
adverse agglomeration effect or something qualitatively different13, its policy 
implications are clear. At least in the case of Greece, the spatial selectivity of 
policies seeking to maximise the productivity effects of FDI should be such so 
as to direct foreign investments towards less dynamic, less urbanised and less 
competitive regions in the country.14 Moreover, our results show that FDI 
spillovers tend to be positive at the very localised level (with the exception of 
what concerns large domestic firms, which operate at a different scale), even 
after controlling for self-selection of FDI firms into high-productivity areas. 
The overall effect remains negative, but this is due to a very strong negative 
effect on local productivity coming from the location of foreign investments in 
neighbouring regions. The implication of this finding is of paramount 
importance especially as it has foregone the attention of most of the FDI 
literature: not only is the effect of FDI spatially heterogeneous or conditioned 
on specific firm, sectoral, and regional characteristics, but it is moreover 
dependent on geographical proximity.  
This seems to us to suggest that different mechanisms are in operation at 
different geographical scales –at least in the case of Greece. Although we 
cannot provide direct evidence to support this interpretation, it appears that 
                                                 
13
 For example, it is consistent with the observation that FDI spillovers tend to be weaker in areas 
exposed to high domestic and international competition, because firms in such areas have already 
acquired the technological features that foreign-owned firms are believed to carry with them. 
14
 This is particularly relevant for Greece today, as the country has just legislated a new “fast-
track”procedure for so-called ‘strategic investments’ (mainly from abroad) and is embarking on a new 
phase of FDI promotion, to deal with the acute investment problems that it faces following the fiscal 
crisis and the austerity measures that were implemented to address it.  
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technology diffusion and learning is very localised, i.e., it takes place at the 
prefectural level, within NUTS3 areas. In contrast, at wider geographical scales 
the effect that dominates is a negative competition effect of market capture and 
demand siphoning, where foreign-owned firms limit the market size of the 
domestic firms and thus push upwards their average production costs and 
reduce their productivity –as domestic firms find it difficult to adjust either 
positively (for example, through product differentiation and expansion to new 
markets) or negatively (through disinvestment and downsizing). This may be a 
feature unique to Greece, as the country is known to have rather inflexible 
industrial relations and inefficient managerial practices, but our sense is that it 
may be true, perhaps to different extents, also in other countries, at least in 
cases where significant spatial differences exist in the competitiveness and 
extroversion of local firms.  
The extent to which this is true, and the particular mechanics under which this 
process takes effect (e.g., the role of agglomeration, openness, industrial 
diversity, etc), is something that we could not address in this paper and that we 
defer for future work. For what concerns the present analysis, the main 
conclusions that we can draw are the following. Foreign investments have 
inequitable location patterns that can intensify existing spatial and sectoral 
asymmetries. In economies such as that of Greece, however, such investments 
do not generate positive productivity spillovers, especially in more developed 
regions. Therefore, their overall impact on relative regional performance and 
cross-regional convergence is not detrimental. Positive spillovers, when they 
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exist, are very localised and dominated by wider-area negative market-capture 
effects. It follows that a successful FDI promotion and regional development 
policy is not a policy that maximises the FDI flows accruing to the country but 
one that addresses effectively two key issues: the location of FDI within the 
national economic space and the conversion of negative competition into 
economic extroversion and market expansion. 
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